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Labour and the Arts : Managing Transformation ? 
 




Public support for the arts in England as introduced in 1945 was already 
atypical in many ways since it operated through an arm's length body 
and left an important role to the private and voluntary sectors. The 
adoption of New Public Management (NPM) did not mean a total 
overhaul of the system, but meant that the State took back some power 
of decision and control through a specialized Department, created origi-
nally in 1992. This Department has asked funding bodies to adopt new 
management methods which are aimed at their beneficiaries as well... 
Attempts have also been made to formalise and modify local govern-
ment support for the arts. 
The implementation of NPM to the arts sector proved to be complex. 
The assessment criteria that were adopted were criticized by most ad-
ministrators and artists alike for being inadequate and simplistic when 
applied to this sector. 
The effectiveness of the new framework is assessed in the context of the 
recent growing support for public spending in the arts from a tradition-
ally sceptical public. The new management, accompanied by budget in-
creases, has led to an instrumentalisation of the arts sector through at-
tachment  and this can be equated more generally with a trend towards 
the commodification of the arts. 
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The transformation of the governance framework implemented since 
the 1990s affected arts policy differently from other policy sectors. Pub-
lic support for the arts as introduced in 1945 was already atypical in 
many ways since it was implemented by a bureaucratic type of admin-
istration with autonomy from direct state intervention through an arm's 
length body, the Arts Council, and left an important role to the private 
and voluntary sectors. The adoption of New Public Management 
(NPM) practices therefore did not cause a total overhaul of the system, 
but meant that the State took back some power of decision and control 
thanks to the creation in 1997 of a specialized Department of Culture, 
Media and Sports (DCMS) – the reformed Department of National 
Heritage that had been introduced by the Conservatives after the 1992 
general election. 
Today, at the national level, the arts are still funded through what are 
now called Non Departmental Public Bodies : Arts Council England 
(ACE) supports the performing, visual arts and literature, and the Mu-
seums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA), created in 2000, funds 
museums and galleries. Both are sponsored by the DCMS and redistrib-
ute funding at the three levels of decentralisation. Local authorities are 
the second largest funder of the arts in England even though the arts 
remain a discretionary area of policy. All these actors, including arts in-
stitutions have been asked to adopt new management methods based on 
structural reforms, joined-up decision making, public/private/voluntary 
partnerships, accountability, users‘ consultation and participation, in-
creased control mechanisms. 
However, it proved complex to apply the new bidding methods of 
funding and the evaluation of the NPM to the arts sector. Quantitative 
assessment criteria of cost-efficiency, users‘ satisfaction and more re-
cently ―engagement‖ with the arts have been criticized by most administra-
tors and artists alike for being inadequate and simplistic when applied to 
the sector. Recently, qualitative assessment based on peer review judge-
ment of ―excellence‖ has been reintroduced after being disregarded for 
some years for its elite and subjective dimension and so has local au-
thorities and institutions‘ self-assessment in an attempt to create a more 
cooperative climate around a new ―reciprocal‖ relationship between 
stakeholders. 
Auteur: Titre  
Although they were presented by governments as a tool to guarantee 
value for money services and to attain cultural democratisation, these 
new management methods have had unintended and detrimental conse-
quences and, paralleled with budget increases, were accompanied by a 
stronger instrumentalisation of the arts sector to answer social or eco-
nomic policy objectives (attachment theory). They can more generally be 
equated with a trend towards the commodification of the arts. While the 
Labour governments‘ policy objectives have varied little since 1997, alt-
hough excellence replaced access as the key idea, their repeated attempts 
at reforming the sector along NPM lines point to the relative failure of 
applying NPM to the sector as the latest changes, introducing some 
shifts in targets and control mechanisms, might indicate. When other 
policy sectors still operate under top-down hierarchical control, the tra-
ditional arm's-length model demonstrates the specificity of the arts with-
in government. 
A New Governance Framework for the arts : Managerialisation 
and Organisational Change 
The Difficult Coming to Age of a New Culture Department ? 
In January 2009, DCMS Secretary Andy Burnham, declared that after 
a year of crisis and modifications, improved work relations with funding 
bodies were well under way as a result of the introduction of a new 
range of managerial practices and the reassertion of the arm‘s-length 
principle allowing funding to be distributed by experts
1
. Various NPM 
practices had already been introduced since 1997 to improve ―best value‖ 
through more effectiveness and cost efficiency. On the side of govern-
ment however, dissatisfaction had been growing at its limited capability 
to actually impose managerial change in the arts system. The conse-
quences of introducing a host of new management approaches and 
managerial practices, for state arts policies are by no means clear-cut. A 
direct causal relationship between the former and the latter is difficult to 
identify not least as a result of the complexities of attempting to identify 
precisely how, and why, arts policies have an effect
2
. A second major 
problem in establishing such a relationship is the arm‘s-length nature of 
central state control over the arts sector where the capacity of the centre 
to steer other organisations operating at  national, regional or local levels 
                                                 
1 After just six months at the DCMS, Andy Burham was appointed Minister for Health 
in June 2009, exchanging job with Ben Bradshaw, a former journalist whose energy 
is expected to concentrate on the Media. The Stage Podcasts, 07/01/2009. 
2 Gray, C., 2009, pp. 574-585. 




is severely restricted. Given the emphasis in NPM on the role of the 
centre in steering
3
 rather than rowing, limits on central state steering ca-
pabilities in the arts sector are a severe restraint on its ability to manage 
the system.  
The managerialisation of the arts sector developed at the same time 
as the introduction of NPM during the 1980s. While four variants of 
NPM can be discerned – the neoliberal, the participative, the political 
economy/bureaucratic control, and the rational managerialist
4
 – these 
were not equally used in the field of the arts, and where they have been 
used the consequences have rarely been as straight-forward as central 
governments may have intended. The intention of the Conservative 
governments that led the way in managerialising the arts sector was to 
change the underlying framework upon which the arts support system 
rested, rather than with changing the specific policies that were utilised 
within it. Given the restrictions on central action in terms of the range 
of arm‘s-length bodies that existed in the field, the government attempt-
ed to change things through direct legislation affecting the role of local 
authorities in cultural provision – such as the contracting-out of man-
agement of leisure services – and through the power of appointment 
that the centre has. The latter was significant in affecting the priorities 
that the arm‘s-length bodies had – as in the case of the appointment of 
William Rees-Mogg as Chair of the Arts Council of Great Britain in 
1982
5
 – even if there was little, if any, evidence that the Conservative 
governments of the 1980s and 1990s were prepared to over-ride the 
arm‘s-length principle and impose managerial change within the arts sec-
tor. 
The Labour governments post-1997 have effectively been more 
managerially interventionist into the arts sector than the Conservatives 
were through both the use of the reformed versions of NPM that they 
have been associated with, and through the appointments that they have 
made: Gerry Robinson, the Chair of ACE between 1998-2004 was ap-
pointed specifically to reform the management structures and processes 
of the organisation (this is discussed further below). In undertaking re-
form, the Labour governments have been assisted by the presence of 
                                                 
3 Pierre, J., Peters, B., 2000. 
4 References to NPM practices and comparisons with other sectors are based on: Bez-
es, P., 2005/06; Hoggett, P., 1996; Hood, C., 1991, 1998; Hood, C. & all, 1999. 
5 Sinclair, A., 1995, pp. 253-255. 
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the DCMS. Taylor noted that the effectiveness of the DCMS in control-
ling the arts policy sector depended upon ministerial activism, policy re-
view and guidance, systematic review and the control of arts finance
6
. 
The mechanisms that the DCMS has used in these have developed di-
rectly out of the NPM reforms of the 1990s and 2000s, particularly the 
use of the DCMS‘s own Value for Money Delivery Agreement, Funding 
Agreements with particular arts organisations (art galleries and muse-
ums) and Public Service Agreements with arm‘s-length organisations 
(ACE). Alongside these are a host of other control mechanisms that 
governments have made use of for many years including control of 
grants, audit, and a range of reserve legal powers. 
The four stages in NPM practices in Labour arts policy since 1997 fit 
in with the mainstream of Labour reforms. The first one was still influ-
enced by conservative approaches and supported privatisation, although 
this proved difficult to introduce into the arts.  After 1999, this was 
blended with a bottom-up approach to arts policies with the creation of 
Regional Cultural Consortia and through the 2002 decentralisation in-
troduced when the Arts Council was restructured. More generally, local 
partnerships were encouraged in what can be seen as a first phase of the 
joined-up framework. First attempts at public consultation as well as lo-
cal services performance assessment were carried out with disappointing 
results. A third stage has meant increased steering from the centre in-
formed by numerous best-practice studies, leading to: more precise and 
constraining assessment frameworks, the formalisation of responsibili-
ties and partnerships ; the domination of the joined-up approach ; a par-
tial recentralisation of the Arts Council ; extended and new forms of 
consultation. A fourth stage might be appearing with the reintroduction 
of qualitative assessment, a partial move away from quantitative perfor-
mance indicators and more equal negotiations between the centre and 
other stakeholders. 
Even using such tools, however, has only provided the centre with a 
limited capability for effective control of the arts sector. The broad na-
ture of the content of various Agreements has meant that they are ex-
tremely vague in practical terms, particularly for those organisations that 
have a responsibility for turning general desires into specific pro-
grammes that are capable of effective implementation. Even when 
quantified targets have been set for the DCMS this is not directly con-
trolled or managed by the DCMS but, instead, by bodies like ACE, mak-
ing the centre dependent upon them for policy success. The continued 
reliance on the arm‘s-length principle may allow central government to 
                                                 
6 Taylor, A., 1997, pp. 441-466. 




escape from claims of political interference in arts funding decisions but 
it also means that the centre has no effective mechanism to ensure that 
its own policies will actually be pursued. At best the range of Agree-
ments that the centre has introduced allows some general control over 
the broad parameters of arts policy, at worst they can become simply 
devices to be worked around and used to shift the blame for unpopular 
decisions to central government. The form-filling and box-ticking that 
have become common across the entire public sector since the intro-
duction of particular NPM practices, for example, are often used as ex-
planations for why policies have failed – managers are too intent on the-
se peripheral concerns and forget to actually provide services, thus di-
verting criticism away from internal managerial failings and towards the 
requirements of central government.  
DCMS Public Service Agreements (PSA) have been the basis for the 
evaluation of policy effectiveness. They reflect the second, third and 
fourth stages in NPM : they evolved from encouraging general objec-
tives in 2001-04 to stating clear quantitative targets in 2005-08. They 
vowed for instance to increase the number of people who participate in 
an arts activity and attend arts events at least twice a year by 2 % and 
3 %. Those targets were not reached, neither were another 16 out of  
the total of 20, but three for ethnic minority arts attendance were. The 




In 2008 the DCMS was reproved by the House of Commons Com-
mittee of Public Accounts for its lack of cost-efficiency in the grant 
making process of its nine funding bodies. In 2006-07, these had award-
ed grants of around £1.8 billion (ACE being the biggest fund distributor 
with around half a billion per year) and spent some £200 million on ad-
ministering them. The report particularly criticized one ACE pro-
gramme for individual artists for costing as much as 35 pence for one 
pound awarded when the average stood between 3 to 8 pence per 
pound. The application process was found to be very complex and time-
consuming for both applicants and grant givers. The report recom-
mended that DCMS encourage its NDPBs to share best practice and 
find common efficiency savings, for instance by centralising regional 
processes and by introducing new technology to process grant applica-
                                                 
7 DCMS, 2009, p. 165. 
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tions
8
. These shortcomings should have been solved by the previous re-
organisations and the novelty of the recent changes lay not in their goals 
but in the new and more detailed mechanisms devised to achieve them. 
The first in a series of resulting reviews, led by culture Minister Mar-
garet Hodge, looked at ways to strengthen DCMS regional policy by 
drawing together the distinct strands of the cultural policy sector to en-
able the development of policy (and funding) coherence and synergy 
and deliver long-term savings that were to be reinvested into cultural 
provision. Although they will continue with their existing sector specific 
responsibilities, the responsibilities of the four cultural agencies (ACE, 
MLA, Sports England, English Heritage) have been joined-up. The sys-
tem is expected to consolidate collaboration between regional and local 
partners, notably to devise and implement regional and local strategies
9
. 
This infrastructure will replace the DCMS eight Regional Cultural Con-
sortia (also NDPBs), introduced in 2000 to find sectoral coherence. As a 
mechanism to provide a single meeting-place for the range of arm‘s-
length bodies that the DCMS has overall responsibility for at a regional 
level, as well as to link up with the multiple cultural functions of local 
authorities, it was anticipated that there would be the creation of clear 
directions for where cultural interventions could be made for the benefit 
of local areas
10
. While the Consortia produced a range of publications 
outlining their cultural visions for particular areas, and argued the case 
for the importance of culture across a range of public and private activi-
ties, they were increasingly seen by central government as being ineffec-
tive in policy terms (not least because they had no powers to ensure 
compliance with their policy wishes), and increasingly expensive. DCMS 
has then retreated to a dependence on individual arm‘s-length agencies 
to provide co-ordination across the range of functions it has. 
Changes in the DCMS and a politicisation of arts funding since the 
1970s have both affected the role of ACE whose increased funding was 
largely predicated upon the introduction of NPM forms of managerial 
change. The following clarification of their roles through Funding and 
Public Service Agreements was also tied in with ACE being expected to 
make considerable efficiency savings – one third of staff were cut and 
grant schemes streamlined from 100 to five, for example, as part of the 
2002 reform
11
. Despite this ACE has not devised a real national strategy 
                                                 
8 Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2007–08. 
9  <http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/media_releases/5236.aspx>, consul-
té le 12/08/2009. 
10 DCMS, Regional Cultural Consortiums, London, 1999. 
11 Doustaly, C., 2007, pp. 16-23; ACE, 2007, pp. 1-3. 




―driven from the centre‖
12
. DCMS attempts to steer the arts from a distance, 
using an increasing number of objectives, standards, targets, and per-
formance indicators, allowing better defined policy objectives and im-
proved budgeting and management systems, but this was expensive and 
led to fragmentation, coordination and control problems. 
The 2002 reform was thus seen as being ineffective if not destructive 
and the following ACE Action Plan was little implemented, leading to 
further reforms in 2008-09. The DCMS continued to look for financial 
as well as structural improvements and the reforms were also intended 
to answer criticisms concerning the complex funding bureaucracy and 
lack of funding criteria clarity. Many voices also asked for a return to 
funding assessments that would balance socio-economic targets with ar-
tistic value. The latest ACE reform in July 2009 followed most of the 
recommendations of the McMaster and the two McIntosh reviews. 
McMaster had called for a move from a system based on measurement 
to one based on judgement, agreeing with McIntosh that ACE had to 
rebuild its credibility with the arts sector by involving arts practitioners 
in its policy and funding decisions
13
. Peer review was thus re-introduced 
despite long-standing criticisms of the system
14
. The 2009 reform is also 
expected to save £6.5 million a year in administrative costs with further 
cuts in staff numbers. The new ACE is intended to be administratively 
flexible with simplified management and funding processes. The nation-
al ―Head Office‖ will concentrate on national strategy, assisted by art form 
experts; the regional offices will be streamlined to concentrate on rela-
tions with organisations and artists, and four area offices will deal with 
budgets, funding decisions and draw up planning and investment strate-
gies. These changes are in tune with the shifts in NPM towards the 
modernisation of public services even if they are likely to require a con-
siderable cultural shift within ACE to become fully effective. The re-
forms should be in place by April 2010
15
. 
Local authorities : new governance and control mechanisms 
Local arts budgets vary enormously and have been cut in the past 
years to make overall efficiency savings. 8 % of local authorities have no 
                                                 
12 ACE/Alan Davey, 2008; ACE/McIntosh, 2007/08; ACE, 2006. 
13 NCA, April 2002; ACE/McIntosh, 2005; ACE, 2006; DCMS/McMaster, 2008. 
14 Hutchison, R., 1982. 
15 ACE, June 2009, pp. 2-9. 
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arts services at all
16
. One of the reasons is that it is difficult to make the 
case for arts spending in quantifiable terms as can be done for other 
public services
17
. Since 1997, to deliver better public services, Labour 
governments have introduced a new governance framework based on 
network arrangements integrating local authorities and representatives 
from the public, private and voluntary sectors, Regional Development 
Agencies and NDPB‘s regional agencies. The 2002 ACE reform led to a 
partnership agreement between ACE agencies and local authorities us-
ing DCMS rhetorics around multilevel governance, defined as the dis-
appearance of hierarchical relationships between the different powers
18
 : 
―We are equal partners in a joint enterprise to improve quality of life in every com-
munity.‖
19
 The partnership identified four common priorities : ―creative 
economies, healthy communities, vital neighbourhoods and engaging young people‖
20
 
— which explains the gradual distance ACE took with artistic assess-
ment and the fact that its recent reintroduction might endanger that 
partnership. 
In network governance, which originates in the 1990s ideology of lo-
calism, lobbies and voluntary groups are central actors to allow a move 
from an overhead to a pluralist democracy
21
, but one can doubt whether 
the members from these partnerships were really equal or whether this 
amounted to a kind of formalised consultation from a unified ACE un-
der DCMS rule. However, the role of ACE‘s regional agencies was de-
fended by the fact that local ambitions were often held back by limited 
financial resources and artistic expertise, small public appeal and the dif-
ficulty of checking the value for money of these services via the assess-
ment tools applied to the rest of the public sector. The number of po-
tential socio-economic projects the arts could be attached to was a main 
obstacle to partnership working since it multiplied the number of stake-
holders whose objectives necessarily diverged from the at least partly ar-
tistic priorities of ACE. The drafting of common strategies was seen as a 
way to overcome this difficulty
22
. 
Since 1999, central government has tried to steer action in the arts 
through the 40 Local Public Service Agreements integrating arts-related 
objectives. Local authorities have been encouraged by the DCMS to 
produce cultural strategies with Local Strategic Partnerships to fit in the 
                                                 
16 National Association of Local Government Arts Officers, 2008. 
17 Doustaly, C., 2008, pp. 75-95. Gray, C., 2009. 
18 Stoker, G., 2004, p. 20. 
19 ACE/Local Government Association, 2003, p. 9. 
20 ACE, 2003, p. 29. 
21 Stoker, G., 2004, p. 10, p. 14, p. 17. 
22 Doustaly, C., 2005, pp. 79-82.  




Best Value National Performance Indicator, BV114 (―Does the local au-
thority have a local cultural strategy?‖). Little was developed at the time in 
terms of monitoring and reviewing these
23
. The framework was deemed 
insufficient by central government and Local Strategic Partnerships, alt-
hough they are still not statutory bodies, have recently been reinforced 
to clarify and prioritize objectives and outcomes. The Local Government 
and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 states that improvement of local 
public services should be led by Councils working in partnership : a new 
“duty to cooperate” as partners in LSPs now applies to many public bodies, 
notably ACE and MLA. This points to the flaws of past models of part-
nerships introduced by the Labour Best Value plan. Each LSP now has 
to agree on a ―sustainable communities‖ strategy which sets out the main 
agenda for improved services in the economic, social and environmental 
sectors. The related Local Area Agreements (LAAs), which identify in-
dividual or shared responsibilities to implement the strategy, offer a tool 
to measure performance in terms of standard and value for money
24
. 
From next year, each LAA will be subject to an annual review, the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment integrating local authorities self-
assessment and improvement plans that were absent in the past
25
. Here, 
as with arts organisations, active involvement in the assessment process 
is being introduced by the centre in an attempt to make control better 
accepted and therefore more efficient. 
The new framework was devised to allow more central resources de-
volution and space for greater local decision making. The drafting of the 
new LAAs is the result of negotiations between Central Government, 
represented by the regional government offices, and the local area 
through Local Strategic Partnerships. The notion of « co-design » is 
stressed as a way to ―increase ownership of the policy and ensure opinions from 
across the delivery system are better addressed‖. The ―spirit of a new central/local re-
lationship‖ is expected to strike the right balance between locally and na-
tionally driven priorities : neither top down nor bottom up, and not only 
joined-up — we could call it ―reciprocal‖, since it at last accepts the idea 
of differing objectives between actors and the ability of the centre to ef-
fectively control what is going on within the arts sector as a conse-
quence of its control of key resources. A maximum of 35 targets can be 
                                                 
23
 The 1999 Local Government Act set a new general duty to achieve Best Value. 
DCMS, Creating opportunities, 1999, pp. 17-18, p. 32. 
24 DCLG, LAA Annual Review 2008/09, September 2008. 
25 DCLG, 2006; DCLG, Roles and Responsibilities…, 2008, pp. 23-27. 
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selected by each area amongst the 198 National Performance Indicators 
(NI) (replacing ―best value‖ performance indicators) so as to encourage 
local and central partners to prioritize effort and resources. Areas are 
expected to develop « more sophisticated evidence based on the ―story of 
place‖ to underpin these choices », hence to answer their areas‘ specific 
needs rather than apply a for-all formula. Two of these national indica-
tors will directly assess arts services : NI10 (visits to museums and gal-
leries) and NI11 (engagement in the arts). They will be purely quantita-
tive measuring the number of times the adult population has attended or 
participated in these activities in a year through the Active People survey, 
the first of which will be released by December 2010. The arts can also 
be seen as contributing towards other NIs, such as education (―positive 
activities for children‖), the community (―volunteering‖), or NIs related to lei-
sure, civic involvement, regeneration and the economy
26
. The arts sector 
worries about the influence this form of evaluation will have on arts ser-
vices which might be tempted to favour quantity, such as supporting 
large popular events to maximize the number of participants and com-
promise other local priorities for the arts. Most of the areas that have 
chosen NI11 need to increase engagement by 3%, some by 6% or more. 




Most of the changes discussed above concentrate on joined-up ap-
proaches to the management of the arts. The voice option, a bottom-up 
approach symbolized by the use of public consultation and participation, 
seems less favoured than in the former Labour reforms. This might re-
sult from the relative failure of formalized public consultations through 
arts forums apart for one-off community arts projects. These forums 
were initiated to express citizens‘ needs in local partnerships, but have 
tended to attract the traditional arts public whose needs are already well-
known. Lack of interest from the general public, difficulty in assessing 
local needs and the absence of satisfactory frameworks to consult and 
increase participation were identified as recurrent obstacles
28
. However, 
public participation schemes have regained impetus in different public 
services as a result of the spread of participatory budgeting from com-
munity projects to larger service budgets. Some of the benefits advanced 
in the arts are similar to those expected from arts forums : an increased 
awareness of the arts for the local community and an improved relation-
ships between artists and the public, but the practice could also help 
create a heightened sense of ownership of publicly funded arts and the 
                                                 
26 DCLG, LAA negotiations in 2008, September 2008. 
27 NCA, 2009. 
28 Doustaly, C., « La décentralisation… », pp. 78-79. 




exploration of new funding opportunities by arts organisations. Howev-
er, a recent ACE report warns that it has the same limits as other forms 
of public consultation ―arts projects fare well in the small-grant, community-
focused form of participatory budgeting […] that are seen to benefit the community 
directly, provide value for money, are easy to understand and appeal to voters’ emo-
tional response [and] with an explicit social or educational remit‖. It is difficult to 
see how the practice could apply to mainstream funding
29
. The arts sec-
tor believes the public lacks expertise and would favour ―populist art work 
at the expense of quality, diversity and risk-taking‖, a move away from recent 
changes in ACE policy towards ―excellence‖, but in keeping with NI11 lo-
cal authority quantitative assessment. ACE has declared no intention to 
impose participatory budgeting, but said it would improve relations with 
the public and increase involvement in the arts
30
. The report was re-
moved from ACE site shortly after its release, which might indicate a 
desire to avoid controversy while ACE reform is being carried out 
and/or until the government‘s announcement that local authorities will 




The many a time modified control mechanisms introduced by the 
centre point to their relative failure but new structures of arts funding 
and the new assessment practices such as self-evaluation and peer re-
view indicate a new direction for New Labour although the contribution 
they will be making to deliver improved services is still to be studied. 
The Impact of the New Governance Framework 
Despite the limits that have been identified above, the centre has 
had clear effects – sometimes directly and in an intended fashion, and 
sometimes through the unintended consequences of central action – 
upon the arts sector. Identifying and explaining these effects are im-
portant for both understanding the limits of NPM as a control mecha-
nism, and for clarifying how NPM can generate new patterns of organi-
sational behaviour to manage the demands that are made upon inde-
                                                 
29 Participatory budgeting is defined as « a process whereby citizens are given the power to decide 
how a public budget should be allocated », ACE, June 2009. 
30 Doustaly, C., « La décentralisation… »; The Stage, ―Industry expresses concern at 
plans to give public a voice in arts funding‖, 06/07/2009, p. 4. 
31 DCLG, Communities in Control: Real People, Real Power, 2008. 
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pendent actors within the system. Apart from the managerial conse-
quences of the development of NPM mechanisms in the arts sector, this 
process of effecting behavioural change has also been associated with 
three distinct policy developments within the sector: attachment, in-
strumentalisation and commodification. 
The first development derives from the limited political significance 
that the arts sector has within the United Kingdom as a whole. While 
there are difficulties in making NPM work in the arts sector, we have 
demonstrated that successive governments have attempted to make use 
of the repertoire of devices that have developed within this managerial 
system. Even if central government has only limited capability to impose 
their managerial intentions on the host of semi-detached (in the case of 
arm‘s-length agencies) or completely detached (in the case of local au-
thorities and, of course, the private, community and voluntary sectors) 
organisations that are active in the field of arts support there have been 
real policy consequences arising from the managerialisation of public 
policy that NPM involves. The emphasis in demonstrating how all areas 
of public policy feed in to central government policy concerns is a key 
element of all of the Agreements that the centre uses and forms an im-
portant part of the assessment process for the Audit Commission in the 
case of local authorities
32
. This emphasis then leads in to the develop-
ment of an attachment strategy on the behalf of publically-funded arts 
organisations that can lead to a shift in policy content and policy inten-
tion. 
Attachment strategies are used to garner political, economic, status 
and social support by, usually smaller, policy sectors that are, by them-
selves in a politically weak position
33
. The arts sector in Britain has nev-
er had much political support at the level of national government – even 
if individual policies, such as the effective abolition of admissions charg-
es to the national museums, have been popular with the general public – 
and the development of mechanisms to provide such support has always 
been present within the British political system, even if with varied lev-
els of effectiveness. The more recent manifestations of this attachment 
strategy can be clearly related, however, to governmental pressure to 
bring individual policy sectors into a more coherent, ‗joined-up‘, policy 
system
34
. In practice there has been the development of two distinct 
forms of attachment strategy in the case of the arts. The first of these is 
concerned with overall sectoral coherence through joining-up mecha-
                                                 
32 Audit Commission, 2005. 
33 See the arguments in C. Gray, 2002. 
34 See Ling, T., 2002; Pollitt, C. 2003. 




nisms, primarily at the regional and local levels, which were discussed 
above, and the second is concerned with a more straight-forward policy 
attachment model where the arts sector links itself to the policy con-
cerns of other policy sectors altogether, leading to an instrumentalisa-
tion of arts policy. 
While attachment strategies can be seen as a bottom-up attempt to 
provide protection for a politically weak policy sector, a set of top-down 
influences, both implicit and explicit, can also be seen to exist in the sec-
tor. The second form of attachment mentioned above can be seen to 
have clearly instrumentalising implications. The extent to which this has 
been a deliberate strategy by central governmental actors or whether it 
has been an unintended consequence of the managerial reforms that 
these actors have introduced is an open question
35
. While the weakness-
es of the cultural policy sector, and the arts sector as a component part 
of this, have left it open to a range of instrumentalising pressures it still 
requires political actors to make choices about how they respond to the-
se. The English case is not exceptional in this regard as there are similar 
pressures at work in other countries
36
 but the consequences that may 
arise in the British case are potentially significant for the future of the 
arts sector. 
While the arts can be used in a multitude of ways and can have an 
equally large number of effects on both the producers and consumers of 
art, the current emphasis on policy attachment stresses the non-cultural 
and non-artistic dimension to art in ways that have rarely been so explic-
itly stated in the past. Apart from the political, social, economic and sta-
tus benefits that instrumentalisation can bring to the arts sector there is 
the added advantage that the attachment of the arts to other policy sec-
tors can supposedly provide the sorts of quantitative evidence base that 
is almost entirely lacking for the arts sector in the normal run of things. 
Frequent claims are made about how the arts can provide a basis for ef-
fective urban regeneration
37
, how cultural quarters based around the arts 
can create jobs and attract investment
38
, and how the arts can lead to 
                                                 
35 The intentionality of instrumentalisation is discussed in the context of the museums 
and galleries sector in the UK in C. Gray, 2008. 
36 See C. Gray, 2007. 
37 This is discussed in C. Doustaly, 2008. 
38 These claims can be found in, for example, S. Roodhouse, 2006. 
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social inclusion
39
 and have educational and health benefits for the con-
sumer of arts. The limited evidence to demonstrate that this is unam-
biguously the case may not be academically persuasive but it is certainly 
used to justify why expenditure on the arts in Britain should be seen as 
an investment rather than as simply a subsidy for un-economic arts ac-
tivities.  
Such claims – that the arts have an economic benefit that is greater 
than the amount the state spends on funding them – have been made 
with increasing frequency since the mid-1980s and are not necessarily a 
result of the managerialisation of the arts through the utilisation of 
NPM principles and practices, but could be seen as stemming from 
similar ideological pressures to those associated with NPM, the influ-
ence of arts advocates (including ACE and many local authorities), and 
even by arts organisations as part of an attachment strategy to gain 
funds and political support. While NPM reforms have certainly contrib-
uted to an organisational environment where attachment strategies be-
come a viable tool for arts organisations to pursue, it can be argued that 
there are deeper underlying pressures for change within the arts sector, 
particularly the shift to ‗excellence‘ rather than ‗access‘ following the 
publication of the McMaster Report, that could be seen to originate in 
the interactions of the institutionalised interests of ‗transversal admin-
istration‘, elected politicians and particular private interests
40
. In this 
case the managerialisation of the arts is a consequence of change rather 
than being, necessarily, the cause of change in itself. 
Organisational and policy changes do not operate in a vacuum and 
the general political context within which NPM, attachment and instru-
mentalisation have been introduced needs to be discussed if any coher-
ent understanding of them is to be developed. The development of 
NPM can be argued to be part of a process of commodification that has 
developed since the mid-1970s. This process is underpinned by a shift 
from use-value to exchange-value and a replacement of political values 
by economic ones as a means of assessing the validity, efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of state policy initiatives. This macro-level change is built 
upon distinct ideological re-conceptualisations of the role of the state in 
society, and of the relationship of states to citizens. Translating these 
changes into specific practices and structures requires change to take 
place in: 
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- the organisational structures concerned with the delivery of public goods and 
services (for example, abolishing old, and introducing new, organisations);  
- the financial systems that are used for the spending of public money (for exam-
ple, shifting from public sources of finance to private or lottery ones);  
- organisational ideologies and orthodoxies to allow changes to be implanted into 
the system (as with the underlying rationales behind NPM); 
- the managerial systems, structures and practices within which organisations 
function (again, as with NPM)41. 
As with all systemic changes the commodification process is not a 
simple one and, in the case of the arts in England at least, there have 
been shifts in emphasis between a clearly economics-derived and pri-
vate-sector approach to reforming the system under the Conservative 
governments of 1979-97, and the more managerially-orientated system 
that the Labour Party has stressed since then. Despite the rhetoric of 
some government members – and many academics – the Labour Party 
approach has been less free-market in orientation, certainly in the case 
of the arts, than may have been anticipated. Certainly the associated re-
forms that the commodification thesis would expect to see in organisa-
tions, finance, management and ideology have all continued to take 
place under the Labour Party but with sufficient differences to indicate a 
clear demarcation between the Labour and Conservative paths to re-
form, even if the end product may prove to have much the same effect. 
Conclusion 
After twelve years of Labour government, the arts sector has un-
dergone many changes that would appear to be just as frustrating for 
arts practitioners as for ACE, local authorities and the DCMS. This frus-
tration stems from the multiple difficulties of developing effective cen-
tral control over a sector that, by its very nature, is not capable of being 
managed in a simple, hierarchical, top-down manner, as the continued 
managerial shifts that central governments have made with regard to the 
sector since the 1980s effectively demonstrate. Notwithstanding this it is 
evident that the sector, as a whole, has seen real change taking place 
with continuing developments in each of the areas associated with the 
commodification argument. The examination of managerial change in 
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this paper demonstrates that organisational, ideological and financial re-
forms have also been undertaken in an attempt to transform the nature 
of state involvement in the sector, with the shift from questions of ac-
cess to those of excellence being merely the latest steps in a continuing 
process of political choice and action. 
The managerial reforms that the Labour Party has introduced have 
placed pressures on the arm‘s-length principle that the arts sector rests 
upon, particularly in the field of accountability. Attempts to identify the 
roles of participants within the system through the use of quantified tar-
gets, funding and service agreements, and the more recent shifts to-
wards the use of qualitative data may have clarified some of the respon-
sibilities that exist within the system, but did not resolve the tensions 
that underlie it
42
. Indeed, the most recent changes could be seen to be 
an attempt by the Labour Party to dissipate the growing disillusionment 
of the arts system
43
 with the consequences of earlier changes. This pro-
cess may also be accelerated as a result of what appears to be the devel-
opment of a ―bidding-war‖ over the arts between the Labour and Con-
servative parties in the run-up to the coming general election, with 
Shadow Ministers claiming that the arts would benefit from a Conserva-
tive government, that the DCMS is wasting arts money, and that Labour 




While politicians continue to use the arts as a political football for 
reasons of electoral advantage, the managerial transformations that the 
Labour Party has undertaken have served to concentrate the minds of 
those within the arts sector to a greater degree than was the case in the 
past. The development of a new campaigning and advocacy zeal within 
ACE alongside the actions of the NCA (National Campaign for the 
Arts)
45
, Equity (the actor‘s union) and other supporters of the arts in 
England could be seen to be having an effect in developing a more con-
scious public support for the arts although how far this will hold up in 
the light of the likely adverse effects of the credit and banking crises on 
the state of the public finances in the United Kingdom remains to be 
seen. Whatever the future holds, however, the arts sector is unlikely to 
remain immune from further pressures for change in the coming years. 
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